


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THE HEAVY DIVISION AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony R. Jones
United States Army

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THE HEAVY DIVISION AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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In a period characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty, the U.S. has developed a National Security Strategy based upon the fundamentals of strategic deterrence, forward presence in key areas, crisis response, and reconstitution. The most likely area of future conflict and instability is in the Third World. An area embedded with age-old animosities, poverty and economic stagnation, education and infrastructure deficiencies, and a desire for democracy and self-determination. The U.S. response to future challenges evolves around capabilities inherent in a military strategy which relies on twelve active component divisions--eight of which are considered heavy organizations. With these forces we must respond across the full spectrum of conflict, focusing on power-projection by a mostly CONUS-based force. The heavy division is deployable, versatile, lethal, and expansible, but requires a commitment from the executive and legislative branches of our nation. We must educate the American people to look long-range for commitments and implications of strategy or we will succumb to the pitfalls of previous periods in the history of our country. This study is about the future.

INTRODUCTION

In the post-Cold War environment that has rapidly emerged, the United States will play a key role prompting global stability and reducing instability in the Third World. In fact, the United States has several roles--as a leader, a role model, an ally, and a superpower. Clearly, no other nation can assume the status of superpower and the responsibilities of world leadership to influence the 1990's. So, the U.S. must take the lead, supporting global and regional organizations, such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Vital interests of the U.S. and its allies, the means to achieve self-determination and national sovereignty, and the dissolution of the roots of instability--these must be in the forefront of future national strategy and the military strategy to support it. Both strategies must look well into the 21st Century. The heavy division with its combined arms lethality has been a key component in U.S. forces since World War II (WWII). This type of unit will continue to have a vital role. This paper explores how, why, and the implications of sustaining such a force.

STRATEGIES FOR STABILITY

Global security is the key to establishing and sustaining stability for a new international

system--protection of sea lines of communication, economic outlets, and proliferation of education through communications and understanding. Each region must establish collective security agreements to protect common interests, preclude territorial encroachment, and assist in furthering of economic interests.

The U.S. role in international security is three dimensional--as a vital member of the United Nations, as a supporter of regional alliances, and as a member of a network of bilateral defense arrangements. The Asia-Pacific Region is a prime example of the latter. The U.S. maintains five mutual defense treaties with Asia-Pacific countries.¹

The United Nations (UN) is the key international organization. The UN Charter and the UN Security Council provide a framework for establishing international laws, responsibilities, and an equitable system of justice. Simultaneously, a grass roots approach can be developed regionally. Mutual acceptance by nations and governmental legitimacy starts regionally. A secure regional climate from which to develop national sovereignty, self-determination, human rights, and resolution of deep-rooted grievances provides a building-block approach to global security and stability.

Collective Security, a term first enshrined in Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant, is thus the key to regional and international security.² The success of defense alliances by regional states has not been good, but many of these alliances did not have the support of a superpower to put teeth in their cause. A collective organization provides a means for mutual understanding, defining goals, and establishing trade amongst members. The success of NATO attests for security alliances. A three dimensional strategy by the United States, as a world leader, will foster global security. Only patience and leadership will produce a New World era.

National security requires a supportive military strategy, or the ability to preclude regional violence from escalating into a global confrontation. Regional security, maintaining vital interests, retaining creditability as a superpower and leader, and negotiations from a position of strength are products of a strong military and coherent national military strategy.

The President has defined four military fundamentals of the future new world era: to ensure strategic deterrence, to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crisis, and to retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces should this ever be needed.³ The military is the means to secure national security

strategy ends and must remain a viable force in the international system. The United States must have a credible military force and the ability to project power before people of other nations will listen.

THE MILITARY ELEMENT

The many ambiguities and uncertainties that exist in the Third World are key elements in determining future military forces. Not unlike in the 1970's, many academics and some government officials are propagating the notion that the New World Order makes military force less important than before. To some extent their view reflects a faulty understanding of key relationships between military forces and conditions of international stability. The measure of success is better seen in terms of what does not happen than what does. A concept of deterrence, distinct from warfighting, prevails in a review of our national military strategy, defense imperatives, and force mix. For one of the first times in recent history, military forces are to be designed based on capabilities, not a defined threat. Although these trends are proper, there is a danger of undermining them in the translations into military forces. As Dr. Wallace J. Thies has said, "Winning wars is wonderful, preventing them is even better, but to prevent wars it is first necessary to be able to fight them."⁴

The future still holds danger for the United States. The decision has been made to reduce our military forces by 25 percent--the lowest level since the beginning of the Korean War. Meanwhile, ballistic-missile technology, along with the capability to manufacture biological and chemical weapons, is now fairly common, even in Third World countries. As many as 20 nations could have nuclear weapons within the next decade--completely aside from the independent republics that could result from the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁵ In addition, over 100 nations have in their military inventory more than 1000 main battle tanks.⁶

The potential for future conflict remains and the danger in such conflict, in fact, increases. First, although the countries of Europe have ousted dictatorial rulers in favor of domestic governments, their internal politics remain unsettled and the potential for conflict emerging from long-suppressed regional tensions remains high. Second, the diffusion of modern military technology throughout the Middle East fuels potential for future conflict in that volatile region. Third, in several parts of the world, legitimate governments may disintegrate in countries racked by social revolution. Finally, external aggression remains a potential tool to relieve chronic domestic problems. For centuries before the Bolshevik Revolution, for example, the Czars of Russia and their agents used territorial expansion

to help compensate economically and diplomatically for Russia's poverty and backwardness.⁷

This discussion sets the stage for developing our future commitment to a specific force composition within the Total Army Concept to achieve our objectives. It is now time to look at the strategy-force mixtures more specifically.

As President Bush's National Security Strategy of the United States outlined in August, 1991, the end-state military force must meet several criteria: It must be trained and ready; balanced and flexible; deployable, versatile, and lethal; and smaller but expandible. It must also maintain forward-looking warfighting doctrine and continuously modernize to sustain warfighting capabilities.⁸

Achieving these goals requires some drastic changes. Prior to the end of the Cold War our national security objectives were to contain the Soviet Union and deter attack on the U.S. and our allies. The military strategy to attain these objectives was through forming coalitions to offset the Soviets and their proxies, maintaining a forward defense in Europe and specific regions, and sustaining the capabilities of war for a flexible response to secure our vital interests and protect our allies. To do this, we

maintained a combined Active and Reserve component force of 28 Army divisions.⁹

As we now reduce our forces, our new military strategy has four fundamental challenges--to ensure strategic deterrence (primarily nuclear), to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crisis, and to retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces as needed.¹⁰ This new strategy addresses the full spectrum of conflict for war, specifies the return of the majority of our forces to the Continental United States (CONUS), and demands the retention of a power-projection capability. By the mid-1990's the Army forces to achieve these ends will be 25 percent smaller than the current strength levels, and organized into 20 divisions--twelve Active and eight Reserve. Of the twelve Active divisions, eight will be heavy and four will be either light, airborne or air assault.¹¹

THE HEAVY DIVISION

The resultant mix of forces in our projected base force is clearly a commitment to the heavy division to meet our national strategic objectives.

This commitment invites several questions. If the smaller future Army has a primary role of contending with uncertainties, why rely on so many heavy divisions--

especially if CONUS-based? Is not the heavy division the hardest to reconstitute, most expensive to sustain, and demands continual combined arms training? Are not the challenges for strategic mobility correspondingly increased? The answer to all of the above questions is yes, but the heavy division still provides us the means over the next 10-15 years to meet our national military objectives. First, the mechanized and armored divisions that comprise heavy forces are flexible and agile, and possess lethality and firepower far above any comparable organization in the world today. Even the former Soviet Union admittedly rates the U.S. divisions superior to their Soviet counterparts. Although the Soviet assessment was based on technical characteristics such as mobility, firepower, protection, and command and control--the Soviets consider the U.S. tank division to have over twice the combat potential of their motorized rifle division. Likewise, the M1A1 tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle are rated superior to the T80B and BMP-3, respectively.¹²

Moreover, heavy units comprise over two-thirds of our active Army forces. So, the heavy division gives us a military force superior in combat potential to organizations of any other nation in the world today. Coupled with the quality of U.S. soldiers in these units, their training and intense commitment to readiness, this capability has several

desirable effects. First, it gives the U.S. a means to negotiate from a position of strength, project military power, and deter aggression. Second, this force is versatile to allow use across a range of situations--nation assistance, crisis response, and answering regional conflict. Most importantly, this force demonstrates resolve to our allies as we sustain 43 different security obligations and collective security agreements.¹³

This is the picture as it appears from the national level and outside the organizations. The question remains: How does the world look from inside a heavy division? The future role of the heavy division was discussed with two former armor division commanders--both commanders during Desert Storm. These two leaders shared their vision of the future and reinforced answers to why the future base force is weighted in favor of the heavy division. Lieutenant General Ronald Griffith, now the Inspector General of the Army, formerly commanded the 1st Armored Division. He stated that potential battlefields of the future could require heavy forces. To him, Desert Storm clearly demonstrated the mobility, lethality, flexibility, and sheer combat power inherent in heavy divisions. General Griffith reemphasized the need for a global view--that if you look around the world, there is no question that the geography and the threat require heavy forces.¹⁴ The challenge, to

General Griffith, will be in training and sustaining heavy divisions. Despite the Army Chief of Staff's commitment to training and quality of life, General Griffith admitted, "It's going to be tough."¹⁵

Major General Paul Funk, former commanding general of the 3rd Armored Division, reinforced the comments of General Griffith in a separate interview. General Funk stated that the heavy division may be the most complex in a field environment. Even so, he noted, it is by far the best-killing and heaviest firepower organization we have. Furthermore, he reiterated a view that ties force capabilities to American military values, which includes caring for our soldiers. We must have maximum firepower on the ground when we put our soldiers in harm's way. Because the U.S. cannot "out infantry" the Third World, the U.S. Army must compensate. Combined arms and firepower win wars. General Funk emphasized that until the U.S. takes advantage of technology to get the most effective and efficient weapons, the heavy division is a certainty. The more heavy divisions on active duty, the better.¹⁶

Both of these leaders, strikingly similar in their comments, acknowledged that the heavy division will be the mainstay for wars across the continuum of conflict in the next 20 years.

The preceding discussion explains why the heavy division will be important in U.S. military architectures for the foreseeable future. The question remains--how this type of division can be maintained in the future, because it is not certain that a critical ends-means gap does not exist. Following are examples of some issues facing future military leaders that threaten the viability of heavy forces.

Changing Conditions of Military Employment

The American way of war is changing. The current enemy is uncertainty as we seek a national strategy to secure U.S. vital interests, and to influence security and democracy in the world. The adoption of a power-projection strategy requires U.S. policymakers, both military and political, to revise past assumptions and establish a new frame of reference for planning and implementing America's foreign and defense policies. Central to this new frame of reference is the fact that the United States no longer has the power and resources to "go it alone," or settle all crises unilaterally.¹⁷ This new frame of reference--a shift to a coalition orientation in warfighting--demands changes or at least a rethinking of how heavy forces will be placed and used.

Using a CONUS-based force for power projection, a broader, more flexible capability is key to force composition. This strategy implies that, for heavy forces to be effective, key decisions for military intervention will be required early as a crisis threatens vital U.S. interests. An early decision to mobilize forces demands drastic departures from past practices. In the past, these critical decisions have not been timely. In part, reluctance to and delays in mobilization were deliberate, tied to the dangers inherent--Cold War superpower confrontation. Any step toward major movements, regardless of motive, could be perceived as preparation to attack a superpower adversary and thus risked nuclear confrontation. The decline of superpower competition may make such delays obsolete. One of the pitfalls of a CONUS-based force is still the decisionmaking process. The reluctance to deploy forces overseas is inherent in a democratic domestically-oriented nation. Decisions will likely be debated in terms of political resolve, staying power, and long-term strategy. The mere economic costs of preparing heavy divisions to deploy overseas will be a brake on decisionmakers, unless there is an imminent, flagrant threat to vital U.S. interests. Thus it will be neither easy nor often to make an early commitment, as CONUS-basing requires.

As already suggested in discussing mobilization, domestic issues will play a key role in formulating and executing future military strategy. The U.S. must clearly articulate foreign or international goals and objectives to appease the American public. The budget deficit and waning support for large military budgets are certain to batter and possibly erode this current strategy.¹⁸ As Harry Summers has discussed in his treatment of the Gulf War, the U.S. Army is an extension of the American people, not the government. To be effectively supported, the Army and its needs must be clearly understood and accepted by the public. Sustaining the heavy division will require a new level of public education or the force will be dangerously weakened.¹⁹

A power projection strategy does offer a reasonable alternative to the forward-deployed strategy of the last four decades, and aligns more clearly with the realities of a changing globe and limited resources at home.²⁰ The real dichotomy exists in developing a foreign policy which keys on long term commitments and goals and a domestic policy which is more quick-fix oriented. To be an effective extension of the American will, programs of security assistance must identify the returns on our investments, be void of issues such as noncompliance with arms control policy, and provide economic growth objectives.

The role of the heavy division to seize opportunities or reduce risk, is still unclear. This role, however, must be part of an integrated approach which commits all elements of power as necessary to promote stability and democracy, and which reflects U.S. resolve and unity of effort to influence world order. Issues such as energy sources, global environment, economic migration and narcotic trafficking only complicate the specificity of roles for the heavy division organization in a CONUS-based force. Forces that engage in future operations will be no different than those that engage in conventional military operations. What differs is how they are used.²¹

The United Nations will take a new, meaningful role in the future. In this context, the smaller U.S. force will be politically and logistically dependent on host-nation support to intervene in regional disputes. Alliances and coalitions are fundamental aspects of a lower U.S. military profile overseas. Many of the alliances, both regional and bilateral, were previously formed based on Cold War strategy. The real issue is whether many of these alliances are still relevant. Planning for deployment of a heavy division entails prior cooperative agreements, possible prepositioning of equipment, and access to ports. These latter concerns can only be arranged between countries that share long-term interests over time, a delicate and

demanding diplomacy.²² As Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm showed common interests and sufficiently compatible infrastructure do not require overt, explicit coordination. Saudi facilities were in place and accessible despite previous diplomatic detachments based on conflicting U.S./Saudi positions on Israel. The ability to deploy and use heavy divisions depends on at least such preconditions.

Total Army Forces and Organization

Factors that are not specifically military will have major impacts. A weakness in our ability to execute our new strategic focus is our low level of understanding of the cultures into which we may have to project power. Arrogant expression of the Western cultural point of view, which may be a higher risk with mainly CONUS-based forces, may cause immediate loss of credibility and undercut long-term goals, when dealing with Third-World partners. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm were remarkably successful in overcoming the difficulties of often-close working relationships between Western and non-Western military personnel. Some of that success, however, stemmed from the extremity of the threat and will not always be repeated elsewhere. Heavy divisions are modeled after a protracted conventional war scenario. Employment of these organizations into culturally diverse, Third-World nations will require specificity in roles to achieve political ends. Employment may also depend

on more extensive integration of Civil Affairs into both tactical organizations and planning.

A key component or resource of military organizations is soldiers. In modern warfare, there is no substitute for well-trained, well-motivated and well-disciplined warriors. The Persian Gulf war was won because of the superior quality of our Armed Forces and superior leadership, as well as the inferiority of the enemy in these regards.²³ Although a future force, known as the Base Force, has been established, many challenges remain. An imperative in future capabilities is attracting and retaining high-quality soldiers and civilians, but are we sending mixed signals to our military professionals? A smaller force means more risk for retention, a questionable sense of job security, and the old problem of people wanting to commit to a service with a future, not just a past. Our military leaders have reemphasized the point that it took 15-20 years to build a capable force with leaders who are technically and tactically confident.²⁴ The budget will constrain our force structure. The smaller, more flexible force can be of better quality and more efficient if we begin a positive approach today to build tomorrow's force. Even then, we will accept risk within our national security strategy. The heavy division does give us a capable organization from which to project military power.

incorporating a balanced design of deployability, lethality, and sustainability. This organization and the position of power the U.S. enjoys today is a result of a long-term commitment to defense.

Our mix of Active and Reserve component forces must be refined to meet future military strategy. We need to factor organizational designs into plans for transitioning from a peacetime Army with a small Active component to one much larger, possibly one fully mobilized in a time of national emergency. Expansibility must be at a level that allows quick integration and improves the overall fightability of the force. We need to determine the type of Reserve component assets and echelons which most lend themselves to short-notice deployment.²⁵ Congressional leaders often state the monetary savings for defense in National Guard and Reserve forces. While there are real efficiencies to achieve with the Reserve component, force mixes must be carefully balanced to prevent problems of readiness, equipment, maintenance, training and mobilization requirements. It is unconscionable to keep Reserves only to sustain a political constituency at the expense of combat potential. Reserve units still exist without a parent division to augment, complement or support. Brigade-size units are retained solely for political reasons. The Total Force policy has not worked as advertised--with an

enthusiasm to save money and improve the image of the U.S. Reserves.²⁶ Many issues must be resolved to ensure there is a coherent relationship between U.S. military strategy and available forces.

Future power projection strategy depends on mobilization of reserves and joint operations. The Reserve forces require tailoring to ensure that the Total Army Forces and organizations complement each other in roles and missions. Legislation needs review to allow timely utilization, training, and readiness of all forces. These changes are imperative to long-range commitments and supportability of heavy forces in military strategy.

Training and Doctrine

The future implications for training and doctrine are clear. Our national military strategy for the future is changing. Key aspects for training and doctrine must maintain momentum while accommodating change. Power-projection is a joint and/or coalition force operation. Technology has changed battlefield dynamics. Joint training and preparing units to conduct contingency operations are essential. We must think through the future changes across the operational continuum and adapt our doctrine. Versatility, deployability, lethality, and expansibility are characteristics which require carefully integrated evolution

of Army doctrine, training, organization, material and leader development. AirLand Operations doctrine addresses this and such issues as depth, mobility, battle space, and logistical supportability.²⁷ Changes in doctrine will drive future force design, material development, and leader development.

Recognition of the pitfalls of training our future force in strategic mobility, contingency operations, and coalition warfare are slowly becoming apparent. The next war is most likely a mid-intensity conflict. AirLand Battle Doctrine, the National Training Center, the vast majority of school curriculums, the ground arsenal, and the 50-year focus on Europe have prepared U.S. forces for high-intensity conflict. We must stop preparing for the last war.²⁸

A commitment "to train as we intend to fight" requires a commitment to resource training. With a projected budget reduction of \$50 billion over the next five years, priorities must be established. Training strategies must be innovative and take advantage of every training event and program. Proficiency is achievable with innovation when constrained by the tempo of operations (OPTEMPO), ammunition, and available maneuver space. This a critical issue when integrating Reserve components.²⁹ A major revamping of the opposition forces at the National Training Center (NTC), at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC),

at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC), and in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) will be required to facilitate training for the broad continuum of the future. Increased simulations that exercise command and control in contingency operations, and more training for deployment as well as employment are necessary to meet future requirements. With the current deterioration of the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet and the high cost to exercise these assets in needed proportion, deployment training will certainly lapse.³⁰

Future OPTEMPO levels for training have been reduced due to budget constraints, to include vehicle miles, aircraft flight hours and training ammunition. Similarly, remember that the post-WWII until 1950 policy of no live-fire training exercises contributed to the decline in all forces that was exemplified by Task Force Smith. Combined and joint operations require training to sustain readiness. The shift in strategy from forward defense to projection of combat power, largely with the heavy division, requires emergency deployments and mobilization, including planning to achieve the desired end state; organizing task forces for specific missions, including estimation of logistical requirements; and increasing knowledge of Third-World culture, languages, technical abilities, and

military capabilities and tactics.³¹ Even in a power-projection strategy, readiness does not take a day off.

Technology

Technology provides opportunities to dictate how battle is conducted. The commitment to retention of technological superiority is paramount to future strategy and force capability. Modernization of equipment and organization is by definition a sustainment requirement for future forces and national military strategy. Likewise, emerging technologies inherent in next-generation systems bring a new dimension of effectiveness to combat power. The equipment on hand in our heavy divisions is largely of the 1960's and 1970's era technology. The short-term monetary benefits gained by cancelling major programs are far overshadowed by the loss of capability the systems will provide in the decades to come.³²

Just as we watch the spread of ballistic missiles to Third World countries--thought likely to be twenty-three nations by the year 2000--we must counter these threats and increase the survivability of our forces. The preliminary indications that we are committed to this end are negative. We have stopped procurement of several major systems. We have stopped buying the M-1 tank, the Apache helicopter and will soon terminate acquisition of the Bradley Fighting

Vehicle.³³ These decisions impact on future readiness of the heavy division organization in both Active and Reserve components.

Our new budget strategy attempts to retain monies for research and development by protracting procurement plans for a few essential major systems. This strategy may have the effect of entangling the Army in a vicious cycle the past has proven it very difficult to overcome. Production stretch-outs invariably raise unit costs, reducing even further the number of items that can be bought for a given sum. As unit costs continue to climb, production rates are slowed even further and procurement plans stretch out over longer periods, exacerbating the rise in unit costs. In the meantime, troops in the field must continue to rely on the supposedly outdated or ineffective systems that inspired the search for an elaborate technological fix in the first place.³⁴

As the profit-oriented commercial sector reviews this strategy, fewer businesses will stay in the defense industry. In the past, companies spent a large share of their own money during research and development phases to gain cost incentive bonuses tied to their product--e.g., increased reliability. Sunk costs were regained along with profit during production phases. Without defined production phases and deferred development, many companies cannot

participate in this strategy unless the price tag for research and development is increased and some measure of contract guaranteed--both unlikely.

Without continued investment in technology and modernization, the long-range commitment to the heavy division is waning. The prospects of reduced commitment by U.S. firms in the defense industry opens the door for foreign companies to seize the world arms market. The next century holds the prospect of the U.S. purchasing a major weapons system, such as the replacement for the M1A1 tank, from a foreign country.

Reconstitution-Sustainment-Economics

Another imperative of future national military strategy is the ability to reconstitute our military forces to meet global requirements. The real question for planning reconstitution is what level do we build back to or how much time should we have to reconstitute? If we examine the components of reconstitution--technology, manpower, industrial base, organization and desired capabilities--is reconstitution a viable strategy? I have already discussed the future bleakness of several of these components--all require a long-range commitment.

The sustainment of the industrial base is critical to maintaining a future capable force. Although not solely an

Army problem, the industrial base is an essential element of national security strategy. A prime example of our shortcomings is in review of our strategic mobility capabilities. Both the U.S. Merchant Marine and airlift capabilities have been in constant decline. Since sealift is expected to carry 95 percent of U.S. forces and supplies, without additional investment the country will be hard-pressed to support the current forward-deployed strategy, much less the greater demands of a power-projection strategy. Airlift is critical to U.S. rapid deployment forces. However, Congress has slashed over \$400 million from the C-17 cargo plane over the next two years.³⁵

Defense spending began declining in 1985. By the end of Fiscal Year 1996, Department of Defense outlays will fall to approximately 3.6 percent of the Gross National Product, the lowest since before WWII. As a share of federal outlays, defense will fall to eighteen percent--also the lowest percentage since Pearl Harbor.³⁶ The reality of these defense-expenditure cuts will be seen in training, readiness, modernization and industrial base sustainment. More importantly, today's investment will effect our performance in the future. This trend is nonsupportive of national military strategy. The U.S. must be demonstrably

capable of getting to the scene of potential conflicts with sufficient force to make a difference.³⁷

CONCLUSIONS

In the post-Cold War environment that has clearly emerged, the U.S. will play a key role, promoting global stability and reducing instability in the Third World. The Third World remains the least stable part of the post-Cold War international system. The inherent unpredictability and potential escalation of violence in Third World regions and individual states will continue to challenge the optimism of establishing a New World Order. The fundamental roles of the military in our national security strategy are to provide strategic deterrence, to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crisis, and to reconstitute our forces as needed.

Many uncertainties and ambiguities exist in the Third World, the most likely area of future conflict. The U.S. will look to future challenges with a military force that is 25 percent smaller than today, and comprising a land force of only twelve divisions, mostly heavy organizations. With these forces we must respond to the full spectrum of conflict for war, focusing on power-projection by a mostly CONUS-based force. These future battlefields will pose many challenges for the heavy division as it becomes one of our

primary military means to achieve desired political ends and protect vital U.S. interests.

The American way of war is changing. Our national security strategy must integrate all essential elements of national power--political, economic, military, and social. We must seize opportunities to promote global stability, foster economic growth, protect our vital interests, and preclude encroachment by those who threaten nations pursuing democracy, human rights, and self-determination. Internal goals of U.S. domestic policy such as education, health care, national debt, and preservation of industry and economic growth are also vital considerations in formulation of our national security strategy.

The heavy division has a major role in national military strategy. The heavy division organization is deployable, versatile, lethal, and expansible, but requires a commitment from within the executive and legislative branches of our nation. As Winston Churchill warned after WWII, "Before we cast away the solid assurances of national armaments...we must be certain that our temple is built, not upon shifting sands or quagmires, but on solid rock."³⁸ Many dilemmas will face future military leaders as we attempt to sustain our heavy divisions to meet national military strategy. Only a few have been mentioned.

Many conflicting trends challenge our ability to succeed in the future. We must educate the American people to look long-range for commitments and implications of strategy or we will succumb to the pitfalls of previous periods in this country. Since the end of World War I, virtually every time we have made reductions to our defense forces, we have gone too far, too fast. The fighting capability of the armed forces was diminished, and men and women in uniform were neglected. U.S. credibility overseas was diminished and U.S. troops ultimately paid the price of death or injury by being sent unprepared and ill-equipped into combat situations.³⁹

To put this more in contemporary terms, Dr. Theis summarized in his article on "A Twenty-First Century Army" by stating:

"The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the UN response as manifested by Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm have temporarily side-tracked the latest round of hopes for fundamental change in the conduct of international affairs, but the history of the last 45 years suggests that it will be followed by renewed optimism that the elusive peace dividend will finally materialize. It behooves those concerned about what can be done--in face of the inevitable pressures to the contrary--to ensure that the forces are well-trained to the challenges likely to arise during the 1990's and beyond. The Army of the 21st Century is being built now."⁴⁰

The American people do not expect the military to be wringing our hands about budget issues, but they expect us to win. Our biggest challenge of the future is ensuring a trained and ready Army, maintaining the effectiveness edge.⁴¹ This effectiveness edge can readily disappear if we are not cognizant of the implications of our national military strategy. Not only the heavy division, but the Total Force must meet this challenge.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States must accept its role as leader and superpower in developing a multi-dimensional strategy for global security and an environment from which to promote democracy, self-determination, justice and human rights. Specifically, the U.S. must:

(1) Retain the heavy division as the centerpiece of Army force structure.

(2) Increase Army marketing efforts to educate decisionmakers and the American public on the needs for and roles of the heavy division in the new global setting.

(3) Modify organization, doctrine and training to create greater capability within the heavy division to operate in non-Western, non-warfighting modes, across the operational continuum of conflict.

(4) Insure the continuing viability of the heavy force by intensively recruiting and retaining high-quality soldiers, trimming excess Reserve structure now being retained at the expense of Active forces with defined requirements.

(5) Promote national-level policies to fund and sustain technological advancement, the industrial base, and preclude erosion of future military strategy.

(6) Retain our future political- military focus, applying all elements of national power to foster domestic and foreign peace, stability, and responsibilities.

Finally, national military strategy and our future forces are an extension of the American will and resolve to support our domestic and foreign objectives. As a Nation, we must do it right.

ENDNOTES

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